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INTRODUCTION
A fire in the inhabited portion of a spacccr_ is a greatty feared hazard, but fire protec-
tion in space operations is complicated by two factors. Rrst, the spacecr_ cabin is an
enclo.sed volume, which limits the resources for fire fighting and the options for crew
escape. Second, an orbiting spacecraft experiences a balance of forces, creating a near-zero-
gravity (microgravity) environment that profoundly affects the characteristics of fire initia-
tion, spread, and suppression.
The current Shuttle Orbiter is protected by a fire-detection and suppression system
whose requirements are derived of necessity fzom accepted terre.strialand aircraft standards.
While experience has shown that Shuttle fire safety is adequate, designers recognize that
improved systems to respond specifically to microgravity fire characteristics are highly desir-
able. Innovative technology is parti_larly advisable for the Space Station, a forthcoming
space community with a complex configuration and long-duration orbital missions, in which
the effectiveness of current fire-protection systems is unpredictable.
This paper briefly reviews thedevelopment of risk assessments to evaluate the probabi-
]ides and consequencesof fire incidentsin spacecraft. It furtherdiscussesthe h=portant
unresolvedissuesandneedsfor improvedfire safetyin the SpaceStation, includingthose
of material selection,spacecraftatmospheres,fire detection,fire suppression,andpost-fire
restoration.
RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR SPACECRAFT
Historical Development
Space systems are wadifionatlyassociatedwith the qualifies of high reliabx_ity and
safety. For misdonsprior to the present Shuttle, safety assessments were thorough but qua-
litative, based on analyses such as failure modes and effects.: Pos._'blereasons for the slow-
ness to adopt quantitative methods include the doubt that the involved calculations are the
best use of scarce labor and computer resources and the fear that quantitative methods offer
theappearanceof knowledgewhereknowledgedoesnot exist (F. Fendell, TRW, personal
communication, Nov. 1991). Recently, however, interest has arisen, counter to the earlier
skepticism, in the application of limited-scope probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) to space-
craft.3 In the past year, NASA has announced that a PRA will be conducted on the Shuttle
systems to determine _ priorities and potential safety improvements?
Fire Hazards and the Space Station
Previous space-field risk assessments usually had cursory txeaunents of fire hazards
because of a belief that the probability of an internal fire is slight. Strict acceptance testing
for onboard material selection ensmed that very few, isolated flammable articles enter the
spacecraft. In addition, experimental tests conducted under quiescent, low-gravity conditions
in the Skylab space station indicated that fires spread very slowly in microgravity. 5 These
assumptions are now shown to be optimistic even for the Shuttle, and they are certainly
challenged by the increased fire-sdety s_sses anticipated in the operation of the Space
Station. An initial safety review of the Space Station concept identified fire as a significant
hazatd among the major threats to the well-being of the station? In the cited, comprehen-
sive study, four approaches to fire-flxreat reduction were proposed: design to preclude (fire
prevention), design to control (flammable isolation), protective devices (fire detection and
suppression systems), and i_k definition (minimum acceptance standards). For the risk
definition, an optimization of risk, cost, and benefits established a realistic safety goal of a
residual fire hazard that causes no injuries nor damage sufficient to suspend operations.
The maturity of the designs for the Space Station now warrants additional quantitative
risk assessments. A study by Fuller and Halverson (cited by Kaplan_), though only partially
completed, examined the consequences of six fire-initiation scenarios: electrical shorts/over-
loads, water-electrolysis unit failures, oxygen leaks, chemical reactions, payload-experiment
failures, and improper crew or ground-control actions. A second independent study, still in
progress, utilizes a PRA approach to calculate event probabilities andprocess times from ini-
tiating scenarios (wire overheating, for example) through threats (heat, smoke, and toxins)
to alleviating responses (extinguishment). ! The study is the first to include microgravity fire
experiments to provide information on fire characteristics, emissions, and time constants for
validation of the resulting risk assessment.
Operational Experience
Minor breakdowns in human-crew space missions that could progress into fires are by
no means rare. In Shuttle missions, documented anomalies include five "incidents", at least
six smoke detector false alarms, and at least five smoke detector built-in-_st failures? Thus,
in 7969 hours of elapsed Shuttle mission time (data to October 1992), incidents have occur-
red on the average of once every 1600 hr of mission time. In the reported incidents, listed
in Table 1, the crew saw smoke and embers in the STS-28 mission and detected odors in
the other missions, l°'n All incidents were subsequently identified as thermodegradation
events caused by failures of wires or electrical componen_ None caused a smoke alarm
to actuate. On STS-28, instrumentation did indicate a rise in smoke concentration, but the
maximum concentration was below the pr_c_M alarm _point. The cited incidents never
spread beyond the breakdown source, most likely a credit to the Shuttle material conu'ols
and the prompt circuit-isolating response of the crew.
One may plausibly predict the same rate of fire-precursor incidents on the Space Sta-
tion. One may also predict that the crew will be able to isolate the breakdown source initi-
ally, with further control through fire-extinguisher use, ff this becomes necessary. Space
Station fire protection is complicated, however, by the possibility of an incident occurring
in an untended period, for example, between the assembly missions. The untended station
Table L Shuttle l_re.Risk Experience.
Mission Date Incident Result Response
STS-6 Apr. 1983 Wires fused near matedal p,vcessing No almospherk No alarm
unit; crew detected an odor conmmin_on
measured
STS-28 Ang. 1989 Cablcstminatccmneam'toleleprin_ Smoke and particle _ breakerdid
earned insulation faihee and elecuical commtration not open; no alarm
short ckvui_ crew deaeaed a few reoorded
embers and +smpke
STS-35 Dec. 1990 _ resistor in digi_ display No aunosph¢_ No alarm
crew &mcmd an odin contamination
measured
STS-40 June 1991 Refrigea'atm-fieezerfanmotorfailed;Annosphericcon- No alarm
crewnotedaninitatingodor ruminationidmti-
fled lX_-flight
STS-50 June1992 Ekct_niccapacitorinnegativebody No ammsphc=ic No alarm
ptesmreaplmmUsfailed;crewdetec- contamination
tedanodor measured
safetysystemswillbc monitoredremotelyby the ground crews;and,upon an alarm,the
operatorswillinitiatetheautomatedresponsecycleofelectrical-powershutdown and sup-
pressantreleaseinthe affectedzone. Since thisisthe only optioneven for theprobable
minor,non-fireincidents,an alarminan untendedperiodmay unnecessarilywaste suppres-
santresourcesand possiblydamage components.
KEY ISSUES IN SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY
Material Flammability Criteria
Pioneering teats conducted on the 1974 Skylab space station showed that, for typical
spacecraft materials in normal gravity where vigorous, buoyancy-induced convective flows
are always present, flame-spread rates are 1.5 to 10 times greater than those in quiescent,
microgravity conditions. 5 The flame-spread rate in microgravity, however, has been shown
to increase with forced-air flows (ventilation). For example, representative flame-spread
rates for thin-paper samples determined in _ents conducted at the NASA Lewis
Research Center ground-based facilities are 1.1 cm/s in normal gravity, 0.5 cm/s in quiescent
mi_ogravity conditions, and 1.0 cm/s in forced-flow microgravity. =m3 The latter ratewas
attainedwith a 6 cnttsatmosphericflow opposedtotheflamespreaddirection-- a minimal
ventilationvelocity.Similarly,thelimitingoxygen concentration,orthelowestatmospheric
content in which flames will spread, was 16.5% in normal gravity, 21% in quiescent micro-
gravity, and 16% in forced-flow microgravity.
As a practical necessity, materials for use in spacecraft must be qualified by normal-
gravity acceptance tests. A standard NASA test for sheet materials determines the resistance
to the upward spread of flame (NASA NHB 8060.1C, Upward Flammability Test). The
buoyant air flow in the direction of the flame spread provides a "worst-case" environment
innormalgravityandanassumedsafetyfactorforrnicrogravityapplications.Arecentstudy
suggestspossibleimprovementsinthestandardtestoaidflammabilitypredictions,"butno
studyasyetderivescorrelationsof normal-gravitytocorrespondingmicrogravityflamma-
bility. In addition,common articles of paper, fabric, and plastics that are clearly flammable
must be accepted in spacecraft for lack of suitable substitutes. Usage agreements for these
articlesdemand strictconlrolofquantity,configuration,spacing,and storage.Whether these
specialprovisionscan be continuouslyenforcedduringthe long-durationmissionsof the
Space Stationisa concernforsafetyplanning.
Spacecraft Atmosphere
The aunosphere of the Shuttle Orbiter and the proposed Space Station consists of air
at ordinary sea-level total pressure and oxygen concenwation (21 vol%). Prior to an extra-
vehicular activity (EVA), the aunospheve is modified by removing some of the nitrogen but
not the oxygen. This change decreases the total pressure, but it also increases the oxygen
concenwation to a maximum of 30 vol%. The modified.atmosphere permits the crew to
acclimate rapidly in low-pressore space suits without the need for prolonged prebreathing
timestoreduceblood nilrogenlevelsand preventdecompressionsickness.
An increasedconccnwationof oxygen in theatmospherecan accelerateflammability
considerablyand promote flame spreadfor some materialsotherwise"non-flammable"in
air.A reviewof766 selectedmaterialswith acceptableflame-spreadresistance(innormal
gravity)under airshowed only 654 had acceptablefire-spreadresistanceunderan enriched
30%-02 atmosphere.I#The NASA Lewis studiescitedintheprevioussectionalsonotedthe
slzonginfluenceofatmosphericoxygen on flame-spreadratesinmicrogravity.For example,
data for thin paper show that the flame-spreadrate is increased by a factor of approximately
1.7 in the EVA 30-vo1%-O2 atmosphere compared to that in air. n'_2
In contrast to the hazards of increased-oxygen-concentration amtospherea, aunospheres
with reduced-oxygen concentrations have been shown to offer both life-support and fire-
protection advantages. _e In particular, a reduced-oxygen (or excess-nltrogen) atmosphere in
the untended periods of the Space Station would essentially eliminate the probability of inci-
pient fires requiring the automatic discharge of extinguishant. A systems analysis must
determine the trade-off of the costs of aunospheric nitrogen loss and replenishment prior to
each crew revisit to the savings in reducing the likelihood of untended-period alarms and
their was_ful consequences.
Fire Detection
The fire-detection system under consideration for the Space Station consists of photo-
electric smoke detectors installed to monitor local zones. The sensors use a conventional
principlebased on the responsetotheobscumtionor scatteringofa lightbeam by smoke
particlesintheatmosphereflowingthrougha samplingduct.IvGround-based,smoke-cham-
ber development testshave establishedan alarm setpointof 1.5%/m lightobscurationfor
early warning of incipient fires and smoldering. Whether this setpoint is suitable for rapid
recognition of fire "signatures"inrnicrogravityisnot known. Small-scaletestdatado indi-
cate thatthe averagesizeand concentrationof smoke particlesfrom microgravityfiresmay
vary considerably fzom those of normal-gravity fn'es, m The obvious safety factor in setting
the alarm threshold at a low smoke concenwafion can cause more frequent false alarms from
detector electronic noise or benign atmospheric pollutants (dusts). Other detection-system
requirements, such as alarm-confirmation and failure-tolerance criteria, and even the zone
volume specification for an optimum number and location of sensors in the station, are not
yet established with any confidence.
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Fire Suppression
Proposed fire suppression for the Space Station consists of a primary f_xed system for
remotely actuated discharge of carbon dioxide agent and a secondaxy system of portable
carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Storage quantities and release rates are sized to achieve
a zone flooding concentration of 50 vol% COs, a level based on terrestrial standards and
developmental-test results. The Space Station suppression system has a single-failure toler-
ance; i.e., the primary system is backed by the portable fire extinguishers. In the untended
periods, however, the only alternative upon failure of the primary suppression system is in
the remotely actuated venting of the spacecraft atmosphere to space. The extinguishment
of fires by venting to a sufficiently low total pressure has been demonstrated in small-scale
microgravity tests,s.11 The flow created by venting, however, was shown to stimulate the
growth of the microgravity fire temporarily,n
Analyses suggest that the mechanisms and rates of fire suppression in low gravity may
differ substantially from those in te_estrial environments. _9 Until more data are available,
conservative requirements must govern the spacecraft designs. It is thus possible that the
proposed Space Station suppressant concentrations may be insufficient for effective rapid
extinguishment or, on the contrary, excessive and wasteful.
Post-Hre Restoration
The proposed concentrations of carbon dioxide for suppression by flooding the unsealed
racks or other zones can produce toxic concentrations throughleakage into the Space Station
cabin atmosphere. The prompt removal of excess agent and combustion products from the
spacecraft atmosphere during and after a fire is beyond the standard capabilities of the envi-
ronmental-control system. Localized venting or dedicated emergency contaminant-removal
sy_ms are under study, but these methods require more development. The long-term, sub-
tle effects of toxic and corrosive fire by-products on both the crew health and equipment
performance must also be considered in post-fire management.
CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING DESIGN AND RESEARCH
The Space Station is now undergoing an extensive resmicturing in design and opera-
lions, although it is unlikely that the basic requirements for fire protection will change. F'Lre
prevention, detection, and suppression provisions for currentspacecraft and the Space Station
are adapted from accepted practices in terrestrial fire safety. Shuttle experience indicates
that current fire protection is adequate. Nevertheless, the uncertainties in the nature of fires
and the effectiveness of response techniques in microgravity require that system designs be
conservative with high safety factors. Quantitative risk assessments in progress to evaluate
the probabilities and consequences of fire-related incidents promise results to define practical
safety levels and improve system efficiency. For successful analyses, a primary need is
information on the correlation of normal-gravity acceptance-test data to realistic material
flammability and flame-spread rates in low gravity. The currentsmall-scale tests in ventila-
ted, microgravity environments are to be augmented with practical experiments on repre_n-
tative, thick material sections (requiring Shuttle accommodations). Other needs are data to
optimize fire-detection alarm setpoints and minimum suppressant concentration and flow
rates, to establish alarm confirmation and false-alarm rejection logic, to provide failure-
tolerance alternatives for untended periods, and to develop post-fire cleanup techniques.
SUlVIMARY
The unique, low-gravity eavironmem in orbiting spacecraft greatly influences the
processes of fire initiation, spread, and suppression. For efficient and improved fire-safety
management in future spacecraft, risk assessments are required that incorporate specific
information on spacecraft material selection, spacecraft atmospheres, rue detection, fire sup-
pression, and post-fire restoration.
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